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ABSTRACT 
 
This study integrates various strands of the literature and examines the impact of 
corporate governance quality on capital structure. Quantitative research design is used 
for this empirical study. Sample consists of panel data of the non-financial sector 
companies listed at Pakistan stock exchange over different periods. The data of the 
variables of interest are collected from annual reports published by companies and the 
publications of state bank of Pakistan. The companies are selected by taking a 
representative sample from the whole non-financial sector. 
 
The results reveal that board size is negatively and significantly related to debt ratio in 
case of Pakistani listed firms operating in non-financial sector. The negative 
relationship was found between return on asset (ROA) and debt to equity ratio which 
suggests that Pakistani firms earn higher returns on assets and such firms rely more on 
internal financing resulting in less use of debt. Liquidity shows a strong negative 
association with debt to equity. As for firm size a positive and a significant association 
with debt to equity was observed.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that the corporate governance is statistically 
significant and negatively related to capital structure. This implies that sound corporate 
governance firms pursue lower leverage to avoid financial risk and dilution of powers.  
 
The findings of the study will help the firm managers in achieving an optimal level of 
capital structure. It also helps the regulatory authorities in making lows and providing 
institutional support to make corporate governance mechanisms more effective. 
 
KEYWORDS: capital structure, debt to equity ratio, leverage, corporate 
governance, Pakistan, non-financial sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
  
RESUMO 
 
Este estudo integra várias vertentes da literatura e examina o impacto da qualidade da 
governança corporativa na estrutura de capital. O desenho de pesquisa quantitativa é 
utilizado para este estudo empírico. Amostra consiste em dados em painel das empresas 
do setor não financeiro listadas na bolsa de valores do Paquistão em diferentes períodos. 
Os dados das variáveis de interesse são coletados dos relatórios anuais publicados pelas 
empresas e publicações do banco estatal do Paquistão. As empresas são selecionadas 
por meio de uma amostra representativa de todo o setor não financeiro. 
 
Os resultados revelam que o tamanho do conselho está negativamente e 
significativamente relacionado ao índice de endividamento no caso de empresas listadas 
na paquistanesa que operam no setor não financeiro. A relação negativa foi encontrada 
entre o retorno sobre o ativo (ROA) e a relação dívida / patrimônio líquido, o que sugere 
que as empresas paquistanesas obtêm retornos mais altos sobre os ativos e essas 
empresas dependem mais de financiamento interno, resultando em menor uso da dívida. 
A liquidez mostra uma forte associação negativa com a dívida ao patrimônio. Quanto ao 
tamanho da empresa, foi observada uma associação positiva e significativa com a dívida 
em relação ao capital próprio. 
 
As conclusões do estudo sugerem que a governança corporativa é estatisticamente 
significativa e negativamente relacionada à estrutura de capital. Isso implica que 
empresas sólidas de governança corporativa buscam menor alavancagem para evitar 
riscos financeiros e diluição de poderes. 
 
As descobertas do estudo ajudarão os gerentes da empresa a alcançar um nível ideal de 
estrutura de capital. Também ajuda as autoridades reguladoras a reduzir os custos e 
fornecer apoio institucional para tornar os mecanismos de governança corporativa mais 
eficazes. 
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PALAVRAS-CHAVE: estrutura de capital, endividamento, índice de 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The capital structure of a firm is a specific mixture of debt and equity that the firm uses 
to finance its operations (Abor, 2007). The literature in capital structure began with the 
seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on the irrelevance of capital structure. 
Since then, capital structure continues to be a topic of interest in financial economics 
and produced a large volume of research. Capital structure decision is the essential one 
since the profitability of an enterprise is directly affected by such decisions 
(Kajananthan, 2012). The decision is important as it maximizes returns and because of 
the impact it has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment 
(Abor and Biekpe, 2005). The firms must decide the capital structure that will maintain 
sustainability and generate more wealth. According to Abor (2007), a firm can decide 
among many alternative capital structures. It can issue debt of a large or very less 
amount. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign 
forward contracts or trade bond swaps. In deciding a capital structure that maximizes 
the overall market value, firms do differ in the way they deal with the issue of 
optimizing capital structure requirements. Capital structure should be planned to keep 
in view, the interests of ordinary shareholders and the interests of other stakeholders 
such as employees, customers, creditors, society and government. 
 
Corporate governance is a framework to build an environment of accountability, trust 
and transparency. Corporate governance refers to how companies ought to be run, 
directed and controlled (Abor, 2007). It is a philosophy and mechanism that entails 
processes and structure which facilitate the creation of shareholder value through 
management of the corporate affairs in such a way that ensures the protection of the 
individual and collective interest of all the stakeholders. Good governance practices 
may have a significant influence on the strategy decision of a company, e.g. external 
financing that are taken at board level (Arshad Hasan, Sfdar Ali Butt, 2009). Claessens 
et al. (2002) also maintain that better corporate frameworks benefit firms through 
greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favorable 
treatment of all stakeholders. The countries that have implemented sound corporate 
governance practices generally experienced a vigorous growth of corporate sector and 
grasp more ability in attracting capital to lubricate the economy (Sheikh and Wang, 
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2012). Moreover, sound governance boosts the performance of a company not only by 
establishing and maintaining a corporate culture but also by reducing the cost of capital. 
 
Corporate governance is concerned with the ways by which suppliers of capital to firms 
assure themselves of getting returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Investors prefer to deal with companies with better governance practices (Mishra and 
Mohanty, 2014). In previous studies also, corporate governance has been found to 
influence firm’s capital structure and performance (Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger et 
al., 1997).  
 
The root cause of the corporate governance is the agency problem. Agency theory posits 
that capital structure is determined by agency cost, i.e, costs due to the conflict of 
interest. The literature in this area has been built on the early work by Jensen (1976). 
Corporate governance mitigates agency problems. Because leverage is related to agency 
costs and agency costs, in turn, are related to governance quality, the paper hypothesizes 
that capital structure is influenced by corporate governance quality (Ranjana Rijal and 
Surya Bahadur, 2010). 
 
According to agency theory, conflicts between management and owners of the company 
arise agency problems. These agency problems then create conflicts between the 
interests of managers and those of shareholders. This is the common point where the 
two concepts ,i.e, corporate governance and capital structure meet ( Muhammed Akram 
Naseem, Huanping Zhang, Fizzah Malik and Ramiz-Ur-Rehman, 2017) .In other word, 
when managers make financing decisions about the use of leverage in the capital 
structure of a firm, the element of corporate governance should also be brought under 
consideration (ROSC, 2005). Several researchers (Berger et al., 1997 and Wen et al., 
2002) have focused their attention on the relationship between corporate governance 
and capital structure. For example, weak governance is more significantly leveraged and 
have poorer firm performance than strong governance firms (Jirapon et al., 2012). 
Strong corporate governance mechanisms can reduce agency costs. Managers tend to 
seek lower financial leverage when they confront with the good corporate governance 
on the board of directors (Wen et al., 2002).   
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The main purpose of this review is to examine empirically the effect of the quality of 
corporate governance on capital structure. This study is organized as follow: section 2 
provides an overview of literature on corporate governance and capital structure, section 
3 describes the methodology, section 4 covers the empirical results and discussion, and 
finally section 5 presents conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The main objective of this study is to produce a systematic review of the most relevant 
literature and therefore providing a theoretical background for subsequent research on 
the impact of corporate governance on capital structure. 
 
A systematic literature review is a review of a clearly formulated question that uses 
systematic and explicit methods to identify, select, and critically appraise relevant 
research, and to collect and analyze data from the studies that are included in the 
review. Statistic methods (Meta-analysis) may or may not be used to analyze and 
summarize the results of the included studies (Cohran Collaboration, 2014). According 
to Rosso et al (2008) a systematic review must never provide answers, instead it should 
report as accurately as possible what is known and unknown about the question 
addressed in the review. The fact that an explicit methodology will be employed to 
conduct this review makes it possible to be critically evaluated. 
 
A number of empirical studies have suggested that some aspects of capital structure like 
trade of theory, agency theory and pecking order theory (Mohammed Akram Naseem, 
Huanping Zhang and Fizzah Malik, 2017) and some corporate governance attributes 
including board size, managerial ownership, board independent (Mohammed Akram 
Naseem, Huanping Zhang and fizzah Malik, 2017 ; Saad, 2010; kajanthan, 2012; 
Sheikh and Wang, 2012) may help to better understand the link corporate governance 
and capital structure.  
 
 2.1 Trade-off theory 
 
The trade-off theory states that capital structure is based on a trade –off between tax 
savings and distress costs of debt. Firms with safe, tangible assets and plenty of taxable 
income to shield should have high target debt ratios. The theory can explain why 
profitable companies within the industry have lower debt ratios (trade –off theory 
predicts the opposite as the profitable firms have a large scope for tax shield and 
therefore subsequently should have higher debt levels). Otherwise, the trade -off theory 
state that capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the benefits of debt and 
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the costs of debt. The benefits and the costs can be obtained in a variety of ways. The 
´´tax bankruptcy trade-off´´ perspective is that firms balance the tax benefits of debt 
against the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The agency perspective is that debt 
disciplines managers and mitigates agency problems of free cash flow since debt must 
be repaid to avoid bankruptcy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1994). The trade-off theory suggests that capital structure could either enhance 
or impede productive interactions among the stakeholders. Titman (1984) argues that 
firms making unique products will lose customers if they appear likely to fail. 
Maksimivic and Titman (1991) consider how leverage affects a firm´s incentive to offer 
a high-quality product. Jaggia and Thakor (1994) and Hart and Moore (1994) consider 
the importance of managerial investments in human capital. These perspectives differ 
from the tax bankruptcy trade-off in that the costs of debt are from disruption to normal 
business operations and thus do not depend on the arguable small direct costs of 
bankruptcy (Murray Z. Frank and Vidhan K.Goyal, 2007). 
 
According to the static trade–off theory, a firm maximizes the wealth of its shareholders 
when its capital structure reaches the optimal level via a trade –off of tax benefits 
against financial distress costs of debt (Likai-Liao, Taruna Mukherjee and Wei wang, 
2015), this theory was documented at the first by Modigliani Miller (1963), 
simultaneously with the introduction of taxes, bankruptcy and administration costs. 
 
2.2 Agency theory 
 
The notion of agency conflicts within a firm offers an important determinant of capital 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The presence of significant agency problems 
usually distorts corporate policy choices and weakens corporate performance. 
According to this theory, separation of ownership and management creates agency 
problems due to conflict of interests.to resolve this problem, the concept of corporate 
governance evolved. Thus, firms with good corporate governance are less likely to be 
affected by agency issues (Muhammed Akram Naseem, Huanoing Zhang, Fizzah Malik 
and Ramiz–Ur-Rehman, 2017). However, studies on the adjustment speed of capital 
structure or corporate governance quality in capital structure choices Longley ignore the 
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overall impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed of capital 
structure towards its targets (Ya-Kai chang, RobenK. Chou and Tai-Hsin Huang, 2015). 
 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) interrogates the identification of an optimal capital 
structure and its explanatory variables. The author starts by asking what motivates the 
selection of a debt and equity mix. As a result, the agency theory is proposed and 
explained as when managers have the information regarding the prospects of the 
company, use that information for their own interests, which are different from those of 
shareholders. Subsequently, firms use more debt in their capital structure especially 
when management is pressurized by the shareholders to use funds efficiently so as to be 
able to pay out future cash flows (for example dividends) (Kyreboach-Coleman, 2007). 
 
In summary, agency theory suggests that there are several ways in which debt can help 
mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Holding constant the 
manager´s absolute investment in the firm, increase in the fraction of the firm financed 
by debt, increases the manager’s share of the equity, thereby bringing the managers and 
shareholders interest into better alignment. Moreover, Jensen (1986) argued that since 
debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of free cash flow available 
to managers to engage in excessive perquisite consumption. Corporate governance is 
put in place specifically to ensure that managers act in the best interest of shareholders.  
 
2.3 Free cash flow theory 
 
According to free cash flow theory of capital structure innovated by Jensen (1986), 
leverage itself can also act as monitoring mechanism and thereby reduces the agency 
problem hence increasing firm value, by reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. 
There are some consequences derived if a firm is employing higher leverage level. 
Managers of such firms will not be able to invest in non-profitable new projects, as 
doing so, the new projects might not be able to generate cash flows to the firm, hence 
managers might fail in paying the fixed amount of interest on the debt or the principal 
when it's due. It also might cause in the inability to generate profit in a certain financial 
year that may result in failing to pay dividends to firm shareholders. 
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Furthermore, in employing more leverage, managers are forced to distribute the cash 
flows, including future cash flows to the debt holders as they are bonded in doing so at a 
fixed amount and in a specified period. If managers fail in fulfilling this obligation, debt 
holders might take the firm into bankruptcy case. This risk may further motivate 
managers to decrease their consumption of perks and increase their efficiency 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982). 
 
This statement has been supported by Jensen (1986) which states that from the agency 
view, the higher the degree of moral hazard, the higher the leverage of the firm should 
be as managers will have to pay for the fixed obligation resulting from the debt. Hence, 
it will reduce manager’s perquisites. Extensive research suggests that debt can act as a 
self-enforcing governance mechanism; that is; issuing debt holds managers "feet to the 
fire" by forcing them to generate cash to meet interest and principle obligations (Gillan, 
2006). 
 
2.4 Pecking-order theory 
 
The pecking order theory was first suggested by Donaldson in 1961 and was modified 
by Myers and Majluf in 1984. This theory assumes that because of asymmetries of 
information between insiders and outsiders, the company prefers to be financed first by 
internal resources, then by debt and finally by stockholder’s equity. 
 
Pecking order theory, state that capital structure is driven by firm´s desire to finance 
new investment, first internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally if all fails, with 
equity, therefore, the firms prefer internal financing to external financing (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). This theory is applicable for large firms as well as small firms. Since the 
quality of small firms’ financial statements vary, small firms usually have higher levels 
of asymmetric information. Even though investors may prefer audited financial 
statement, small firms may want to avoid these costs (Petit and Singer, 1985), therefore 
when issuing new capital, those costs are very high. As a result firms prefer first internal 
financing (retained earnings), then debt and they choose equity as a last resort (Petit and 
Singer, 1985). 
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According to Myers (2003), external financing covers only a small part of capital 
formation and that external equity represents a minor portion, with the bulk of external 
financing being debt. This conclusion has been challenged by Franc and Goyal (2003) 
showing that external finance is much more significant, and equity finance being a 
significant component. 
 
Myers & Majluf (1984) contrasting the static trade-off theory, discusses the rationale of 
the pecking order model of corporate leverage, which was later supported by amongst 
others Chen (2004). The model is explained by what has been observed in companies, 
which is the tendency of not issuing stock (shares) and instead holding large cash 
reserves. Myers & Majluf (1984) conclude that this is unnecessarily holding financial 
slacks because of possible conflict of interest by managers as well as between old and 
new shareholders. Chen´s (2004) view is that only when forced by circumstances, do 
companies resort to external financing, using debt before equity. 
 
Kyreboah-Coleman (2007) explains the pecking order theory to be suggesting that the 
profitability of a firm does influence its financing decisions. The study elaborates the 
contention that firms which have not predetermined their debt and equity mix prefer 
internal to external financing.  
 
2.5 Board size 
 
The board of directors is the highest body of a company that is responsible for 
managing the firm and its operations. The board size has been identified as the 
important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness in theoretical articles 
(Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993). An effective board of directors is crucial for the 
successful operations of a company. As important and strategic direction of a company 
depends upon the consensus of the board members, so board size is considered relevant 
in determination of financing mix of the company. Boards are important factor as they 
affect the reliability of annual reports (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004). Board size 
has an inverse relationship with the cost of debt as concluded by Anderson et al (2004) 
in their research and it leads to the finding that larger boards can more effectively 
monitor financial reporting which is considered one of the core responsibilities of 
boards. 
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The empirical evidence shows a different relationship between the board size and 
capital structure. Adam and Mehran (2003) concluded a large board in size can take 
better decisions and can monitor management in a better way than otherwise. Whereas, 
Lipton and Lorsh (1992) found that larger boards are waste of resources and smaller 
boards are more effective an efficient than larger boards. So the evidence regarding the 
association between board size and capital structure is diverse. 
 
 A negative significant relationship is observed between leverage and board size 
(Berger, Ofek, & Yermak, 1997). The CEOs with small board are being monitored 
closely and therefore are less entrenched and issue more debt. Hasan & Butt (2009) 
suggest a negative correlation between size of board and debt to equity ratio indicating 
larger board may exert pressure on managers to follow lower gearing levels and 
enhance firm performance.  
 
According to Adams and Mehran (2003) a large board’s size can examine the 
organization function more effectively and provide better management and monitoring 
of the organization due to the better skills and more expertise. Berger et al (1997) 
suggest that leverage is lower when the board of directors is larger. Is it can be assumed 
that larger boards translates into strong pressure from the corporate board to make 
managers pursue lower leverage to get good performance results, also Anderson et al 
(2004) document a larger board as he found that an additional member on the boards 
bring the benefit of lower cost of debt financing. Conversely, Abor (2007) and Bokpin 
& Acro (2009) conducted a study on Ghanaian firms and found that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the capital structure and the board size. Ganiyu 
and Abiodun (2012) in Nigeria find a positive relationship suggesting that large boards 
are likely to practice effective monitoring due to the sufficient numbers of directors that 
can constitute different regular bodies and that apply high debt level to increase the firm 
value, furthermore, large boards raise conflicts that may lead to difficulty in reaching a 
consensus in decision making which may weaken corporate governance resulting in 
higher leverage. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
      H1: Board size has a significant negative impact on “Debt to Equity ratio”. 
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 2.6 Board independent 
 
Independent board of director means that directors are free to make their judgment and 
these directors must protect shareholders objectives (Fama and Jensen, 1983 and 
Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). According to Sheikh and Wang (2012), a high degree of 
board independence enables non-executive directors to monitor the actions of the 
management more closely. Empirical evidence in relation to board composition and 
leverage yields mixed results. Wen et al. (2012) find a significantly negative link 
between several non-executive directors on the board and leverage. Outside directors 
have a propensity to monitor managers more actively, causing lower leverage used by 
the firm due to the effective control.  On the other hand Wen (2002) also provides 
evidence about the existence of a significant and negative relationship between gearing 
level and representation of non-executive directors on the board. He suggested that non-
executive directors monitor the managers efficiently and effectively, so managers are 
forced to seek lower gearing levels for achieving superior results. According to Bokpin 
and Arko (2009), there is a positive but statistically insignificant alliance between board 
independence and the debt ratio.  Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) documented that firms 
which have outside directors are more competent and are better able to handle 
uncertainties that may occur in the external environment. Moreover, they can make use 
of all those resources which may enhance the performance of the firm and allow them to 
raise finances. 
 
The presence of non-executive directors could lead to better management decisions and 
help firms in attracting better resources given that external board members may have 
good knowledge or useful information on financing facilities. According to Berger et al 
(1997), firms with higher percentage of external directors utilize more debt as compared 
to equity. Kajantahn (2012) suggests a positive relationship between proportion of non-
executive directors and firm´s capital structure. Sheikh and Wang (2012) indicate that 
outside director is positively related with both the measures of capital structure (i.e the 
total debt ratio and the long- term debt ratio). However the positive link indicates that 
boards with more independent directors could take on more debt due to effective 
monitoring. According to Coleman and Biekpe (2006), the independence of the board 
through the appointment of more outside directors is related to long-term debt and total 
leverage. 
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Based on the above discussion, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
     H2: board independence has an insignificant positive relationship with “Debt to 
Equity ratio”. 
 
2.7 Managerial ownership 
 
Managerial ownership includes the shares owned by CEO, directors, their spouses and 
children. CEO and managing director is the same position held by the person heading 
all the management in a firm. If managers own shares in a company, they are less likely 
to consume additional perks or investing the resources of organization below cost of 
capital. Thus, agency problems mitigate through managerial ownership because of 
interests of both the parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Berger et al. 
(2012), the main objective of managers is to maximize the wealth of shareholders and 
achieve the highest performance of the company using fewer debt to prevent financial 
distress. Therefore there is negative association between management ownership and 
management. 
 
Wiwattana and Kentag (1999) in his study found no significant relationship between the 
CEO and managerial holding and debt ratio, conversely, Fosberg (2004) suggested a 
negative significant relationship between CEO holdings and leverage employed in 
capital structure. He argued that CEO will prefer his personal incentives over the 
interests of shareholders. CEO has the executive responsibility to manage the firm´s 
business, while the chairman is responsible for handling the affairs of the board (Sheikh 
and Wang, 2012). Also bathala et al (1994) found a significant negative association 
between firm debt and managerial ownership. They stated for controlling the agency 
costs, firms use to trade –off debt and shares owned by managers. A study of Chinese 
listed firms has reported an inverse relationship between managerial holdings and debt 
ratio (Huang & Song, 2006). Bokpin and Arco (2009) revealed a significant positive 
impact of managerial holdings on debt equity choice of Ghanaian listed firms. 
Kyereboah-Colman and Biekpe (2006) find a negative and significant connection 
between CEO duality and the short-term leverage and total leverage. Whereas Abro 
(2007) and Berger et al (1997) found a significant and positive link between CEO 
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duality and leverage. King and Santor (2008) found a positive relationship between 
family ownership and leverage and suggested that the family who owned businesses 
tend to issue debt to finance projects in order to avoid the takeovers. 
 
Following the above discussion, the hypothesis bellow was framed: 
     H3: Managerial ownership has a significant negative relationship with “Debt to 
Equity ratio”. 
        
2.8 Size of the firm 
 
The size of the firm is assumed to have a positive relationship with leverage. The reason 
is that bigger firms tend to have fewer volatile cash flows and that they take on more 
debt to maximize the benefits from a tax shield. Large firms generally have close links 
with their lenders and finds it easy to arrange debt on favorable terms. The larger firms 
are also believed to be in a better position to diversify their investment projects and 
hence limit their risks due to cyclical fluctuations. Larger firms can therefore be 
considered to have a lower financial distress risk. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that 
direct bankruptcy costs are fixed, and they constitute a smaller portion of firm value as a 
firm increases in size. Smaller firms on the other hand face a different reality in 
procuring long-term debt. This is not mainly due to the information asymmetry, but to 
the strong negative correlation between firm size and the probability of bankruptcy 
(Berryman, 1982 and Hall et.al, 2004). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) the 
transactions costs for large firms are reduced since they struggle with less asymmetric 
information problems. Consequently larger firms tend to have more equity comparing 
with smaller ones. A possible explanation is that basing on (Ferri and Jones, 1979) 
findings, smaller firms often find it relatively more costly to disperse asymmetric 
information and therefore are offered less or significantly more expensive capital from 
financiers and lenders. 
 
Based on previous evidence, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
     H4: Size of the firm has a significant positive relationship with “Debt to Equity 
ratio”. 
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2.9 CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality occurs when a firm´s CEO serves as chairman as well in the board of 
directors. Theoretically, agency conflicts can be reduced, if we separate the duties of 
decision control and decision management. Brickely et al. (1997) argue that separating 
the titles will reduce agency costs in corporations and improve performance. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that the role of CEO and chairman should be separate, as chairman 
is the chief decision control authority and CEO has the responsibility to manage 
business of the firm. But duality can increase power and improve overall judgement.  
CEO duality provides boarder power, authority and control to the CEO (Boyd, 1995). 
Brickely et al. (1997) argued that duality and separation both have benefits and cost so 
there is no significant single relationship between duality and capital structure because 
duality will be good and beneficial for some organization and it is not valuable for 
other. Also this insignificant association was observed by Hasan & Butt (2009) for the 
listed firms in Pakistan. It is suggested that in Pakistan non-executive directors are not 
independent in true sense. However correlation analysis suggests that CEO/Chair 
duality and manager ownership are negatively correlated with profitability. 
  
Sheikh and Wang (2012) find CEO duality is also insignificant and negatively linked to 
with both the measures of capital structure (i,e, short-term leverage and long-term 
leverage). The possible reason is that the presence of CEO/Chair duality signals the 
absence of separation of decision management and decision control and it ultimately 
leads to agency problems. 
 
This insignificance alliance observed by researchers suggests that the separation of two 
functions does not really affect the capital structure choice by the firm (Sathe 
Madhuvanti and Gawade S.U, 2014). 
 
Very few authors support the positive and significant relationship between CEO duality 
and capital structure. Fosberg (2004) finds that firms with separate chairman and CEO 
employ the optimal amount of debt in their capital structures. He discovers that firms 
with separate CEO and chairman generally have higher financial leverage. However, it 
is worth mentioning that this relationship is statistically insignificant. Abor (2007) also 
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observed a significant and positive association between dual leadership and capital 
structure. Kyreboah Coleman and Biekpe (2006) find a negative and significant 
connection between CEO duality and the short-term leverage and total leverage. 
       
Based on above arguments, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
     H5: CEO duality has an insignificant negative relationship with “Debt to Equity 
ratio”. 
 
 
                           Figure 2.1- Conceptual Framework 
 
 
                                                   
                            
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bulathsinhalage S & Pathirawasam Ch. / Journal of Competitiveness, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 19-33, 
June 2017. 
 
 
 
  Independent variables 
      Corporate governance 
 Board size 
 Board composition  
 Board committees 
 CEO/Chairman 
Duality 
 managerial ownership 
 Control variables 
 Size of firm 
 profitability (ROA) 
 
 
 
       Dependent variable 
  Capital structure 
 Debt to Equity ratio 
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Research hypotheses 
 
The study will seek to test empirically the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Board size has a significant negative impact on Debt to equity ratio. 
  
H2:  Board independence has an insignificant positive relationship with Debt to equity 
ratio. ratio. 
 
H3:  Managerial ownership has a significant negative relationship with Debt to equity 
ratio. ratio. 
 
H4:  Size of the firm has a significant positive relationship with Debt to equity ratio. 
 
H5:  CEO duality has an insignificant negative relationship with Debt to equity ratio. 
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CHAPTER 3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
 Databases 
 
The following studies conducted in this research are mostly taken from B-ON and the 
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) databases because of the amount of 
informations that these two databases contain. The Web of Science 
(apps.webofknowledge.com) database was also used but the first two databases sources 
were relevant especially SSRN which is considered one of the important source of 
working papers on the field of economics, finance and accounting. 
 
3.1 First study 
 
3.1.1 Sample and data collection 
 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and capital 
structure of firms listed in Pakistan stock exchange during the period of 2002 to 2005. 
The number of non-financial companies have been examined in this study is 59 which 
are randomly selected for this investigation. 
 
3.1.2 Variables and measurement 
 
The variables used in this study to measure the link corporate governance and capital 
structure are: dependent variable which is capital structure- leverage, and independents 
variables considered as measures of corporate governance like board size, board 
composition,CEO/Chair duality, managerial shareholders and institutional shareholding. 
As for control variables employed in this study as measures of capital structure are firm 
size and profitability. The definition of these variables is listed in the following table: 
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Table 3.1- Variables used in the study 
Variables  Definition and measurement 
Board Size (BZ) The board of directors is the highest body of a 
company that is responsible for managing the firm 
and its operation. Is measured as logarithm of number 
of board members. 
Size of Firm  (SZ) Is taken as total assets. Is measured as logarithm of 
total assets. 
CEO/Chair Duality 
(DUALITY) 
CEO/Chair duality is an important feature of modern 
corporate governance. It indicates the corporate 
management where the CEO also serves as chairman 
of the board. 
Institutional shareholding 
(INSTSH) 
Institutional shareholding is measured as percentage 
of shares held by institutions as disclosed in annual 
financial reports. 
Profitability (ROA) ROA (net income divided by total assets). Is used as 
measure of profitability. 
Non-executive directors 
(NED) 
Non-executive directors are cornerstone of modern 
corporate governance. 
Managerial shareholding 
(MANGSH) 
Managerial shareholding is measured as percentage 
of shares held by members of board disclosed in 
annual financial reports. 
Source: Arshad H. et al. / international journal of business and management Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009 
 
3.1.3 Regression model 
 
This study employs multivariate regression analysis in a panel data framework to 
measure the dependence of capital structure on corporate governance variables. The 
model is presented as follow: 
 
                               LEVit= 𝞫0 + 𝞫1(LogBZ)it + 𝞫2(%NED)it + 𝞫3(INSTSHR)it 
𝞫7(PROF)                         +𝞫4(MANGSHR)it+ 𝞫5(ROA)it+ 𝞫6(SZ)it+ 𝞫7(DUALITY)it  
+ εit.                                      + εit 
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3.2 Second study 
 
3.2.1 Sample and data collection  
 
This study investigates the significant corporate governance attributes that may affect 
the capital structure of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan stock exchange (KSE). 
The sample unit of this study comprise 155 firms of 775 observations over the period 
2004- 2008. The data were obtained from the yearly annual reports of companies 
included in the sample. 
 
3.2.2 Variables and measurement 
 
In this study it has used two measures of capital structure as dependent variables, i.e, the 
total debt ratio and the long debt ratio. The explanatory variables include board size, 
outside directors, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, director 
remuneration, and CEO duality. The control variables include profitability, size, 
liquidity, and asset tangibility. 
Definitions of variables are presented in the table below: 
 
Table 3.2- Variables used in the study 
Variables Definition  
Dependent variables 
Total debt ratio (TDRit) Ratio of total debt to total assets. Total 
debt is the sum of short-term debt and 
long-term debt. 
 
Long-term debt ratio (LTDRit) Ratio of long-term to total assets 
Explanatory variables 
 
Board size (BSit) 
 
Logarithm of number of board members. 
 
Outside directors (ODit) 
 
Ratio of outside directors to total board 
members 
Ownership concentration (OCit) 
 
Ratio of shares held by five largest 
shareholders to total outstanding shares. 
 
 
 
 
19 
  
Table 3.2- Variables used in the study (cont.) 
Managerial ownership (MOWNit) Ratio of shares held by CEOs, directors, 
and their immediate family members to 
total outstanding shares. 
Director remuneration (DREMit) Logarithm of director remuneration 
CEO duality (CDit ) A dummy variable, 1 if CEO is the 
chairman, 0 otherwise 
 
Control variables 
Profitability (PROFit) Ratio net profit after taxes to total assets 
Size (SIZEit) Natural log of total assets 
Liquidity (LIQit) Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
Asset tangibility (ATit) Ratio of net fixed assets to total assets 
Source: Nadeen A.and Zongjun W. / The international journal of business in society, Vol. 12 Issue: 5, 
pp.629-641, 2012 
 
3.2.3 Regression model  
 
In order to gauge the effect of corporate governance attributes on capital structure the 
study employed panel data methodology. The basic regression model is as follow: 
                                                                                                             
                                               Yit = 𝛂  +  𝛃Xit  + uit 
                                                                                                i= 1 …….155, t= 1………5 
 
Where i denotes the cross-section dimension and t indicates the time dimension, Yit is 
the firm capital structure at time t, Xit is a 1* k vector of observation on k explanatory 
variables for the firm in the t period. 𝛃 is a k* 1 vector of parameters, uit is a disturbance 
term and is defined as: uit= µi + vit 
Where ui denotes the unobservable individual effect and vit denotes the remainder 
disturbance. 
 
 
 
20 
  
The method pooled least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the coefficients. 
+    
Model   (1):                             
                                            TDRit =  𝞫0 + 𝞫1(BS)it + 𝞫2(OD)it + 𝞫3(OC)It + 𝞫4 (MOWN)it                             
++ 𝞫 6(SZ)it + 𝞫 7(                  +  𝞫5(DREM)it + 𝞫6(CD)it + 𝞫7(PROF)it + 𝞫8(SIZE)it + 
𝞫6(CD)it                                                 𝞫9(LIQ)it  + 𝞫10(AT)it +uit ………………………………...(1)                                
 
    Model   (2):                                  
                                            LTDRit =  𝞫0 + 𝞫1(BS)it + 𝞫2(OD)it + 𝞫3(OC)it+ 𝞫4 (MOWN)it                             
++ 𝞫 6(SZ)it + 𝞫 7(                  +  𝞫5(DREM)it + 𝞫6(CD)it+ 𝞫7(PROF)it + 𝞫8(SIZE)it + 
𝞫6(CD)it                                                     𝞫9(LIQ)it  + 𝞫10(AT)it +uit ………………………………...  (2)    
 
3.3   Third study 
 
3.3.1 Sample and data collection  
 
In order to more understanding the relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure, another study is provided to investigate the multidimensional aspects 
of corporate governance that may affect the capital structure of manufacturing firms 
listed on the Pakistan stock exchange (KSE). The sample unit of this study comprise 67 
firms of KSE-100, during the Period from 2007 to 2012. Data are gathered from the 
financial reports of these non-financial firms listed in Pakistan stock exchange. 
          
3.3.2 Variables and measurement 
 
Two measures of capital structure are used in this study as dependent variable, i.e, the 
total debt ratio and the long- term debt ratio (Sheikh and Wang, 2012). The independent 
variables include board composition, CEO duality, director shareholding, CEO tenure, 
audit committee, meeting of audit committee, expert in audit committee, big four 
auditors, remuneration committee and nomination committee. Corporate governance 
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index (CGI) has been developed by using binary coding (Sawicki, 2009). A total score 
for each firm is calculated for each year.  The CGI ranges from 0 to 9. With a higher 
score indicating better governance. Firm´s profitability, size and liquidity are considered 
as control variables. Definitions of these variables are listed in table below: 
 
Table 3.3 - Variables used in the study 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables 
Total Debt ratio (TDRit) Ratio of total debt to total assets of firm 
Long-term debt ratio (LTDRit) Ratio of long-term to total assets 
Independent variables 
 
 
Board of directors (BDit) Board independence, as measured by the 
number of independent directors divided 
by the total number of directors, 
Chairman and CEO separation 
Largest directors’ shareholders (as 
measured using direct interest and deemed 
interest divided by total issued shares) 
below 5% of issued capital. 
 
Audit  (ADit) Existence of an audit committee 
 
disclosure of frequency of audit 
committee meeting 
Expertise of audit committee 
Engagement of big four auditors 
Board committee (BCit) Existence of a remuneration committee  
Existence of a nomination commitee 
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Table 3.3 - Variables used in the study (cont.) 
Variables Definition 
Control variables 
Profitable (PROFit) Ratio of profit after tax to total assets 
Size (SIZEit) Size of the log of total assets for firm i  in 
time t 
Liquidity (LIQit) Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
   Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
        
 
3.3.3 Regression model  
 
Multiple regression analysis is used in estimating the relationship between the corporate 
governance characteristics and capital structure. The basic regression model is as 
follows: 
 
                                                      Yit =  𝛂i   +  𝛃Xit  + εit 
 
Where t indicates the time series dimension, and Yit represents the dependent variable 
in the model, which is the firm’s capital structure at time t. Xit   indicates the set of 
independent variables in the model, and 𝛂i is taken to be constant overtime t and 
specific to the individual cross-sectional unit i. The method pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is used to estimate the coefficients. The regression equations that were 
estimated in order to investigate the effects of corporate governance practices on capital 
structure take the following form: 
 
Model 1: 
                                                   TDRit    = 𝞫0+𝞫1CGIit+ εit  
                                                   LTDRit = 𝞫0+𝞫1CGIit+ εit ………………………… (1) 
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Model 2: 
                                                   TDRit = 𝞫0+𝞫1BDit+𝞫2ADit+𝞫3BCit+ εit 
                                                   LTDRit= 𝞫0+𝞫1BDit+𝞫2ADit+𝞫3BCit+ εit ……….. (2)    
  
  
Model 3:          
                                                 TDRit= 𝞫0+ 𝞫1CGIit+𝞫2PROFit+𝞫3SIZEit+ 𝞫4LIQit εit                                                                 
εit…………………………(3)                    +εit 
                                                 LTDRit= 𝞫0+𝞫1CGIit+𝞫2PROFit+𝞫3SIZEit+ 𝞫4LIQit εit                                                                 
εit…………………………(3)                    +εit…………………………………………... (3)    
 
 
3.4   Forth study 
 
3.4.1 Sample and data collection  
 
To gauge the impact of corporate governance on capital structure, the initial sample 
consisted of Pakistani non- financial companies listed in Pakistan stock exchange (PSE) 
as reference. Data is collected from companies’ annual reports, state bank of Pakistan 
publications. Selected companies are 40 and each selected company has observation 
(200) from 2009-2013. Companies are divided in twelve different sectors and 10% of 
the companies from each sector are selected for this study. 
 
3.4.2 Variables and measurement 
 
The following table presents the variables used in this study, their definitions and 
measurement. 
Table 3.4- Variables used in the study 
Variables Definition & way of measurement 
Debt to equity ratio (DR) Used as representative of capital structure, 
which is defined as the ratio of total assets. 
 
Board size (BS) Used as explanatory variable and defined 
as total number of executive and non-
executive board members. 
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Table 3.4- Variables used in the study (cont.) 
Variables Definition & way of measurement 
Managerial ownership (MONN) Defined and obtained as ratio of shares 
held by chief executive officer (CEO), 
directors, and their family members to 
total holdings. 
 
Firm size (FS) Used as one of the control variables and 
the indicator of firm size is taken as total 
assets. 
 
Return on assets (ROA) Defined as the ratio of profit before taxes 
to total assets and used as internal variable 
in this study. 
 
Liquidity (LIQ ) Obtained as the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities and LIQ serve as a 
control variable. 
 
Source: state bank of Pakistan’s publications / companies’ annual reports (Muhammad A.N et al. / 
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.3, No.1.Winter 2017) 
 
3.5   Fifth study 
 
3.5.1 Sample and data collection  
 
According to state Bank of Pakistan (SBP) following are the countries having foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI) in Pakistan. In order to test the impact of corporate 
governance on capital structure 05 non-financial companies from developed countries 
and 05 non-financial companies from developing countries listed in stock exchange are 
considered as samples in the period of (2010-2016). 
 
Table 3.5- List of countries having portfolio investment in Pakistan 
Developed countries Developing countries 
U.K China 
Norway                                                                     Hong Kong 
Canada        Qatar 
USA                                                                            Korea(south) 
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Table 3.5- List of countries having portfolio investment in Pakistan (cont.) 
Developed countries Developing countries 
Australia Kuwait 
Japan                                                                        UAE
France                                                                       Saudi Arabia 
Germany      India 
Netherland Pakistan 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2016) (Tariq R. et al. / Journal of Insurance and Financial Management, 
Vol. 3, Issue 5 (2018) 18-28 
 
3.5.2 Regression model  
 
Econometric model is used to test the impact of corporate governance on capital 
structure by referring to pooled regression data in the following model.  
 
LEVGit =                        LEVGit = 𝞫0 + 𝞫1(Log BSZ)it + 𝞫2(%NED´s)it + 𝞫3(INSTSHR)it + 
𝞫3(%INSTSHR)it + 𝞫        𝞫4(MANGSHR)it + 𝞫5(ROA)it + 𝞫6(SZE)it + 
𝞫7(CEO/Chairman)it    𝞫6(SZE)it +         𝞫7(CEO/Chairman)it  +µt 
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CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1   Findings of the first study 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.1- Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std.Dev 
LEV 177 0.05 6.52 1.48 1.17 1.14 
BZ 177 7.00 19.00 8.46 8.00 2.12 
%NED 177 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.57 0.27 
Inst.Hold 177 0.00 0.56 0.15 0.12 0.12 
MANGSH 177 0.00 0.86 0.21 0.09 0.24 
ROA 177 -0.16 0.30 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Log (total 
asset) 
177 1.96 4.80 3.35 3.47 0.64 
Source: Arshad H. et al. / international journal of business and management Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009 
 
The percentages provided in Table 4.1 present a mixed results. The mean debt ratio 
which is 1.48 showed clearly that the sample firms have higher proportion of debt in 
relation to equity. One may conclude that the Pakistani non-financial listed companies 
tend to have high degree of reliance on short-term bank debt rather than equity finance 
or long-term debt. This result is in line with Booth et al. (2001) who suggested that 
Pakistani firms tend to use more debt in their capital structure compared to firms in 
Canada, UK, USA, Jordan, Malaysia, an other countries and have less debt ratio than 
firms in France, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea. The literature does argue that 
the firms in developing countries generally take more debt that those in developed 
economies. 
 
As for the average size of board in Pakistani listed companies is almost 8.5 with largest 
board of 19 and minimum of size 7 which is larger enough according to Jensen theory 
(1983) which states that, ideally a board should have seven to eight members for 
effective functioning. It is important to have the right number of members on the board 
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because the size of the board can determine the quality of managerial monitoring and 
control (Lakshan & Wijekoon, 2012). 
 
Results reveal that Non-executive directors (NED´s) represent on average 48% of 
boards indicating a good representation of independent directors, but they are not 
independent in true sense because of business that is owned by families. 
 
ROA shows a company´s efficiency in making profit from its assets (Akbari, 2006). The 
average rate of return on assets is 8% showing that the firm´s performance is low in 
terms of utilization of its assets, the value gives the evidence about why Pakistani listed 
firms rely more on debt. 
 
The table 4.1 shows that the average size of Pakistani selected firms is 3.35. According 
to Williamson (1967), it is expected that large companies due to their reputation and 
having more human resources and desirable management have better performance. Also 
bigger companies tend to be more diversified which reduces risks and hence, the 
chances of bankruptcy is less compared with small ones. The result showed in table 
appeared lower compared with, for example, the mean size of Jordanian listed firms 
which is 16.39 in years 2001-2011(Ramadan, 2012).   
 
Managerial ownership is 9% means that only 9 percent of shares owned by company 
insiders, which is low. This may because most companies in Pakistan are family owned, 
also, because managerial ownership is not popular in Pakistani selected companies 
which cannot lead to an alignment of interests between managers and shareholders.  
 
Institutional shareholders represent 12%, which is, also a lower value. 
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Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.2- Correlation analysis 
variables leverag
e 
Log 
Boar
d size 
%NED’
s 
Inst.
Hold 
Manage 
rial 
holding 
ROA Log 
(total 
asset) 
Duali
ty 
leverage 1.00        
Log Board 
size 
-0.07 1.00       
%NED’s 0.04 0.10 1.00      
Inst.Hold 0.15 0.09 -0.28 1.00     
Manag.Hol -0.19 -0.34 -0.25 -0.24 1.00    
ROA -0.25 0.24 0.00 -0.05 -0.23 1.00   
Log(total 
asset)size 
0.14 0.40 0.02 0.13 -0.46 0.34 1.00  
Duality -0.07 0.10 0.18 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 1.00 
Source: Arshad H. et al. / international journal of business and management Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009 
 
The table 4.2 above shows that profitability has a negative effect on leverage, which 
confirms the predictions of the pecking order theory that states firms will favor retained 
earnings over external finance. This finding means that Pakistani firms prefer to use the 
internal funds at the first resort to finance their projects then comes debt.  
 
Correlation analysis provides evidence about the existence of positive correlation 
between size of the firm and leverage. One may conclude that the larger are the firms 
the more lenders feel confident and secure to extend more loans to the companies 
because of the collaterals that these firms have. In addition, this positive association 
might be explained that most banks in Pakistan are conservative in terms of lending 
policies. They are more focusing on firm collaterals. 
 
Board size appears negatively correlated with debt to equity ratio. According to Berger 
(1996), this negative relationship indicates that larger boards normally favor low 
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gearing level and more focus on the firm performance. Otherwise, larger boards may 
exert pressure on managers to follow lower gearing level. 
 
Correlation analysis indicates that managerial holding is negatively correlated with 
leverage. The possible reason is that as manager’s shareholding in a company increase, 
they tend to bring down the size of the firm´s debt to reduce the risk and costs of 
bankruptcy. In case of Pakistani listed firms management-controlled companies are 
generally those whose majority equity is held by family. 
 
 Institutional shareholding is found positively correlated with leverage, May due to an 
efficient monitoring, and reduction of agency cost and managerial opportunism (Safdar 
A. Butt and Arshad Hasan, 2009). 
 
CEO duality is negatively correlated with leverage, which implies  that when CEO 
serves also as chairman in the board he tends to assure a rigorous  monitoring and 
consequently adopting lower level of  leverage for achieving superior results and at the 
same time preventing  pressure and risk associated with large amount of debt. Coleman 
and Biekpe (2006) pointed out this negative connection by arguing that when CEO and 
chairman are same, agency cost increases due to which outside lenders are discouraged 
to lend in such enterprises. 
 
Non-executive directors are positively correlated with debt ratio. This result is in line 
with several researchers’ findings such as Berger et al. (1997) who suggested that those 
CEOs that are more actively controlled and monitoring by more outside directors, 
causing managers to employ more debts and raise the firm leverage. In addition, Sheikh 
and Wang (2012) confirmed that firms with a large portion of non-executive members 
seem to have favorable and easier access to loans and therefore applied a high level of 
debt. 
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Regression analysis 
 
Table 4.3- Regression analysis 
Variables Coefficients t-statistics P-value 
Intercept 2.44 2.52 0.01 
Log Board Size -1.85 -1.98 0.05 
%  NED'S 0.17 0.50 0.62 
Inst. Hold 0.75 1.03 0.31 
Managerial Holding -0.90 -2.12 0.04 
ROA -4.95 -4.14 0.00 
Log (total asset) 0.35 2.33 0.02 
Duality -0.11 -0.62 0.54 
Level of significance 5% 
Source: Arshad H. et al. / international journal of business and management Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009                                             
                                                    
                                  LEVGit= 2.44 – 1.85(Log BSZ)it + 0.17(%NED's)it   
0.5291(%INSTSHR)it         +  0.75(%INSTSHR)it – 0.90(MANGSHR)it– 4.95(ROA)it 
+0.5148(SZE) it+                 +0.35(SZE)it  –  0.11(DUALITY)it+ εt 
 
The regression analysis shows that with 1% increase in profitability, decreases leverage 
by 4.95% so there is a negative and significant association between profitability and 
leverage. According to Fama and French (2001), this result supports the pecking order 
theory where firms with high investment opportunities seem to use less debts to finance 
their investments projects, otherwise, firms use internally generated funds ( retained 
earnings)  as first resort rather than externally funds.  
 
The size of the firm is positively and significantly related to debt to equity ratio. In 
effect, a unitary increase in size leads firms increase their debt financing by 0.35, which 
means that large firms have an advantage over the small firms in obtaining long-term as 
well as short-term bank loans as they have the economies of scales, such as the 
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opportunity for diversification and the ability to disclose more information (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Due and Dai, 2005). 
 
A negative and significant relationship is provided by regression analysis between board 
size and debt to equity ratio. This result is consistent with several researcher’s findings 
such as Berger (1997) and Abor (2007) who argue that larger boards prefer low debt 
levels. Larger boards may exert more pressure on managers to pursue lower debt and 
consequently employing more equity in order to improve firm´s value and performance. 
 
Managerial ownership affects negatively and significantly debt to equity ratio, with 1% 
increase in managerial shareholding decreases leverage by 0.9%. This finding is 
consistent with Friend, Irwin and Lang (1988) who argue that in the absence of any 
external significant shareholding the propensity to have lower debt to equity ratio will 
persist and will result in higher non-diversifiable risk of debt management. A possible 
reason is that this negative association refers to the fact that high gearing level increases 
the probability of default and managerial shareholders interest in long term viability, so 
they favor the low gearing level. 
 
Regression analysis provides evidence that the existence of NED on the board has no 
significant impact on leverage. Therefore, results may reflect the nature of the 
environment in which Pakistani firms operate where family owned business and NEDs 
are generally representatives of financial institution. In order to have a significant 
influence, NEDs should be independents.  
 
CEO duality is negatively related to debt. According to stewardship theorists the dual 
role of CEO may enhance a firm´s performance because there is one clear leadership 
and such a structure eradicates ambiguity regarding responsibilities. Which may lead to 
use a lower level of gearing in order to prevent risks associated with the employment of 
higher debt and keep the firm performed. However, the relation is statistically 
insignificant, may because of nature of Pakistani firms that are mostly family owned. 
 
Institutional shareholding appeared positively and insignificantly correlated to leverage 
the supporters of this finding like Abdoli et al. (2012) indicate that this positive 
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correlation is because of easiest access of institutional shares to different sources of 
financing such loans or bonds. 
 
4.2   Findings of the second study 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.4 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
TDRit 0.59624 0.19151 0.04541 0.99394 
LTDRit 0.22231 0.16743 0.00000 0.87651 
BSit 0.89424 0.06900 0.84509 1.14612 
ODit 0.06837 0.10364 0.00000 0.60000 
OCit 0.58362 0.18160 0.06200 0.97342 
MOWNit 0.29658 0.24681 5.35e-09 0.96595 
DREMit 6.61306 0.54402 3.99246 7.90469 
CDit 0.24903 0.43273 0.00000 1.00000 
PROFit 0.06600 0.10699 -0.31727 0.79671 
SIZEit 21.4830 1.38317 17.91891 25.5683 
LIQit 1.41727 1.06995 0.126257 11.7963 
ATit 0.54661 0.19533 0.026127 0.95639 
Source: Nadeen A.and Zongjun W. / The international journal of business in society, Vol. 12 Issue: 5, 
pp.629-641, 2012 
 
The table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics of both, dependent and explanatory 
variables. As can be seen, the average total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio of the 
selected firms is respectively 59.62 percent and 22.23 percent. The average total debt 
ratio shows that more than half of Pakistani firms tend to rely on debt in their capital 
structure which is consistent with the findings of previous study.  
 
As for the mean value of long-term debt ratio, it indicates that Pakistani firms tend to 
have less long-term debt ratio such as firms in developing countries. This result is 
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consistent with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) who suggested 
that in general firms in developing countries hold lower amount of long-term debt. 
 
The average value of outside directors is almost 7 percent which shows a lower 
representation of independent directors in Pakistani firms, according to Berger et al. 
(1997) this is very low comparing to largest public corporations (for about 53.90 
percent). 
 
Also the descriptive statistics table shows that 25 percent of the firms has a leadership 
style (CEO also serves as the chairman of the board). 
 
The minimum value of board size is 85 percent, that a larger size on board may assure a 
good monitoring management therefore put pressure on managers to follow their 
interests, eventually pursuing lower debt ratio. 
 
Correlation analysis 
 
The table 4.5 (Appendix 1) presents the pair-wise correlation matrix for all variables 
used in the model. The correlation matrix does not suggest any serious multicollinearity 
problems. 
 
 Regression analysis 
 
Table 4.6- Regression analysis 
Model 1 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
Constant 0.857060 0.092100 0.000 
BSit 0.193256 0.072663 0.008 
ODit 0.110904 0.044569 0.013 
OCit 0.054968 0.025892 0.034 
MOWNit -0.027881 0.020906 0.183 
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Table 4.6- Regression analysis (cont.) 
Model 1 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
DREMit -0.065178 0.009992 0.000 
CDit -0.004538 0.010879 0.677 
PROFit -0.584529 0.051772 0.000 
SIZEit 0.011384 0.004118 0.006 
LIQit -0.100180 0.004957 0.000 
ATit -0.177427 0.025982 0.000 
Source: Nadeen A.and Zongjun W. / The international journal of business in society, Vol. 12 Issue: 5, 
pp.629-641, 2012 
 
Table 4.7- Regression analysis 
Model 2 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
Long-term debt ratio (LTDRit) as Dependent variable 
Constant -0.037374 0.083846 0.656 
BSit 0.233208 0.066151 0.000 
ODit 0.073574 0.040575 0.070 
OCit 0.040435 0.023572 0.087 
MOWNit -0.039714 0.019032 0.037 
DREMit -0.055951 0.009097 0.000 
CDit -0.009483 0.009904 0.339 
PROFit -0.163532 0.047132 0.001 
SIZEit 0.006486 0.003749 0.084 
LIQit -0.010136 0.003749 0.025 
ATit 0.535059 0.023654 0.000 
Source: Nadeen A.and Zongjun W. / The international journal of business in society, Vol. 12 Issue: 5, 
pp.629-641, 2012 
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The regression analysis indicates that the coefficients of outside directors are 
statistically significant and positively related to both, total debt and long-term debt 
ratios. Typically, board with more independent directors can monitor the management 
more actively which induce managers to maximize the shareholders wealth, also good 
monitoring lead financial institutions and banks to provide loans with lower cost, hence, 
lower interest rate. This positive association between outside directors and capital 
structure is in line with the findings of many researchers such as Abor (2007), Anderson 
et al. (2004), Berger et al. (1997), and Pfeffer (1972). 
 
 Managerial ownership is negatively related to both capital structure measures, i.e., total 
debt and long-term debt ratios. According to agency theory higher managerial 
ownership aligns the interests of managers with outside shareholders and reduces the 
role of debt as a tool to mitigate the agency conflict. Furthermore, Braislfors et al. 
(2002) argue that as the level of managerial ownership increases, firm control passes 
from external shareholders to the managers and after a certain period of managerial 
ownership, managerial entrenchment leads to debt avoidance. This negative association 
is consistent with Friend and Lang (1988), Fosberg (2004) and Berger et al. (1994). The 
relationship is statistically significant only with the long –term debt ratio. 
 
Regression analysis table shows that CEO duality is negatively related to the total debt 
ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Which means that when CEO serves also as chairman 
in the board, he tends to use lower leverage in order to avoid pressure and risk 
associated with the utilization of high debt ratio. However, the relationship is 
statistically insignificant.  These findings is consistent with previous study results. 
 
Profitability and liquidity are negatively and statistically significant to leverage which is 
in line with the pecking order hypothesis suggesting that firms with higher profits and 
liquidity tend to borrow less comparing to firms with lower profits and less liquid 
resources. 
 
The positive association between firm size and both total debt ratio and long-term debt 
ratio is consistent with the trade-off theory which states that large firms should borrow 
more due to their ability to diversify the risk and to avail the benefit of tax shields on 
 
 
36 
  
interests payments and essentially the bulk of collaterals they have considered as 
securities for banks and other financial institutions. 
 
Asset tangibility is positively and significantly related to long-term debt which is 
rational. As was mentioned before regarding the trade-off theory, the more are 
tangibility assets the more is the tendency to get loans, in other words, tangible assets 
constitute a positive sign to financial institutions, because tangible assets can be pledged 
as collaterals to lenders and thus allow companies to raise debt. Moreover, issuing debt 
secured by collateralizable assets may protect the debtholders from opportunistic 
behavior of managers because it restricts the borrower to use funds for a specified 
project (Nadeem Ahmed Sheikh & Zongjun Wang, 2012). Also tangible assets tend to 
reduce the financial distress costs because of the liquidation possibility in case of 
default. Considering these all factors lenders are expected to feel more confident and 
reluctant supplying loan to a company with high level of tangible assets than an 
identical company with less tangible assets on its balance sheet.  
 
The negative relationship between assets tangibility and total debt ratio might be 
explained that the lack of securities in case of bankruptcy induce financial institutions to 
avoid extending loans (total debt which includes short –term debt) to firms ,  at the same 
time the costs of long-term debt are lower because banks charge relatively higher 
interest rates on short-term loans. Another possible explanation might be raised, 
according to Bas et al. (2009) and Degryse et al. (2010) the negative relationship 
between leverage and asset structure indicates that firms which employ lots of tangible 
assets seem to rely more on internal funds generated from these assets. 
 
Both tables, 4.6 and 4.7 reveal that board size is significant and positively related to the 
total debt ratio and long-term debt. This finding is not consistent with the findings of 
previous studies conducted in this research where was found that large size of board 
may put pressure on managers to pursue lower leverage and hence, a negative 
relationship.  However, the evidence of positive association, may due the fact that large 
size on board, as some researchers suggested such as Anderson et al.  (2004), Abor 
(2007) and others, have more ability to raise funds externally essentially through 
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financial institutions and commercial banks that feel confident secure to deal with this 
kind of boards. 
 
Director remuneration is significant and negatively related to the total debt ratio and 
long-term debt ratio which demonstrate that directors pursue lower leverage in order to 
avoid extra pressure and risk associated with the use of high risk, therefore enhancing 
their positions in the company. 
 
4.3   Findings of the third study 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.8 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
TDRit 0.5618 0.23389 0.08 1.74 
LTDRit 0.0804 0.12953 0.00 0.65 
CGIit 5.2239 1.23322 2.00 8.00 
BDit 2.8657 0.71231 1 3 
ADit 0.7463 0.99217 1 4 
BCit 1.5716 0.43569 0 1 
PROFit 0.1164 0.13149 -0.02 1.48 
SIZEit 15.9162 1.51268 12.19 19.67 
LIQit 1.5716 1.18320 0.13 8.74 
Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
 
The table 4.8 above shows that, the mean total debt ratio of the firms is 0.5618, which 
means that total debt represents more than half of the capital of the firms. That is, 56% 
of total assets are financed by debt capital which shows again that Pakistani firms rely 
more on debt rather than equity to finance their activities. In return equity capital 
accounts for 44% of total assets. As for the long-term debt it represents just 8% on 
average which reveals that the Pakistani listed firms tend to rely more on short term 
debt. 
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The CGI has a mean of 5.2239, which implies that generally sample firms tend to have 
better governance. 
 
The average tenure of the CEO is 8.5 years. This period is higher than optimal tenure 
provided by Equilar data which is 5 years. For instance, in Singapore, the average CEO 
tenure is 6.73 years with the longest CEO reaching 31 years reported in 2001 by Mak 
and Li.  In addition, Shakir (2009) discussed that CEOs are experiencing two phases in 
their term of office which is divided by benchmark of 10 years. The first ten years are 
young tenured CEOs. They are in the phase of building up their reputation and adapting 
to the companies environment so they strive to prove themselves. In effect, they do well 
for companies’ performance. Then as they sit longer in the CEO position, they begin to 
feel more relaxed and lenient with their work or they become too absorbed in their own 
ambition that they refuse to accept changes in the environment. 
 
The mean value of the board composition in Pakistani listed firms presented in the table 
is higher as compared, for instance, with the board composition of Indian country´s 
firms which is 70.9% (Singh & Kumar, 2012). 
 
Profitability reveals a mean value of 0.1164 representing a return on assets of 11.64%. 
This value is low as compared to developed economies. This result may explain the 
dependence of Pakistani firms on debt, conversely, more profitable firms have 
additional choices to allocate their funds and making investment decisions because they 
can take additional advantage of the retained earnings. 
 
  Firm size has a mean of 15.9162. As larger is the firm the lower is its chances of 
bankruptcy. Overall Pakistani firms are classified as small and medium size (SME). 
 
 Liquidity ratio has a mean value of 1.576, which indicates that firms are better off. 
Means that they have a better ability to pay off its short-term debt using assets that can 
be easily liquidated. 
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Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.9 - Correlation analysis 
Variable BD AD BC LIQ PROF SIZE 
BD 1      
AD -0.323** 1     
BC 0.222** 0.509** 1    
LIQ 0.115* 0.231** 0.232** 1   
PROF 0.002 -0.063 -0.007 -0.163** 1  
SIZE -0.055 0.375** 0.197** 0.102* -0.002* 1 
NOTE: *Correlation is significant at 0, 05 level; and ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level, 
Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
 
The table 4.9 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix for all variables used in the 
model. The correlation matrix does not indicate any serious multicollinearity problem. 
Means that there is correlation between independent variables. 
     
 Regression analysis 
 
Table 4.10 - Regression analysis 
Model 1 
variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
                             Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
constant 0.814 0.049 0.000 
CGIit -0.225 0.009 0.000 
                           Long term debt (LTDit) as Dependent variable 
constant 0.190 0.028 0.000 
CGIit -0.120 0.005 0.000 
Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
 
As can be seen in table 4.10, the coefficient of CGI is statistically significant and 
negatively related to both capital structure proxies (total debt ratio and long-term debt 
ratio). Which means that sound corporate governance leads to rigorous monitoring, 
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subsequently, less level of gearing. This finding is quite in line with Wen et al. (2012) 
who suggested that sound corporate governance supports lower leverage to avoid risk. 
Also this result is consistent with prior studies where was found a negative association 
between corporate governance and capital structure. 
 
Table 4.11 - Regression analysis 
Model 2 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
                             Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
constant 0.777 0.052 0.000 
BDit -0.042 0.017 0.414 
ADit -0.221 0.014 0.000 
BCit -0.110 0.030 0.051 
                           Long term debt (LTDit) as Dependent variable 
constant 0.183 0.029 0.000 
BDit -0.026 0.009 0.610 
ADit -0.281 0.008 0.000 
BCit 0.046 0.017 0.420 
Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
 
Table 4.11 shows that coefficient of board of directors (independent directors; CEO 
duality and managerial ownership) is insignificant and negatively related to total debt 
and long-term debt ratios. A possible reason is that the larger are the independent 
directors the lower is the tendency to rely on high leverage in order to prevent pressure 
and especially risk associated with the use of leverage. Moreover, according to the 
findings of Sheikh and Wang (2012), independent directors can monitor the 
management more actively, and therefore force the management to choose those actions 
that maximize shareholders wealth. 
 
The  negative relationship between the both capital structure measures and managerial 
ownership is consistent with the findings of several researchers such as Friend and Lang 
(1988), Sheikh and Wang (2012), Bathala et al. (1994) and Fosberg (2004) .For instance 
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Sheikh and Wang(2012) documented that this negative relationship is in line with  the 
agency theory, supporting  that increased managerial ownership aligns the interests of 
managers with outside shareholders and reduces the role of debt as a tool to mitigate the 
agency conflict.  
 
As for the negative and insignificant association between the CEO/chairman  duality 
and capital structure measured by total debt ratio and long-term ratio, this might be 
explained, by the finding of wang (2012) which argued that leverage is significantly 
lower in firms where CEO does not appear to face strong monitoring. Also, when CEO 
serves as chairman, control and management are concentrated on hands of one person 
and hence assuring a good monitoring which may lead to lower leverage. 
 
Table 4.11 showed also a negative but significant relationship between the coefficient of 
audit and total debt and long-term ratios, one of the explanations of this result is that an 
external auditor protects the wealth of shareholders and restricts the firms from 
borrowing at high cost which necessarily lowers the shareholders wealth (Saad 2010).  
 
The coefficient of board committee which includes remuneration committee and 
nomination committee is found negative and insignificantly related to total debt ratio 
and positive and significantly related to long-term debt ratio. As for the first case, the 
nomination committee nominates the good and expert directors who may work on the 
benefit of shareholders and consequently rely less on higher leverage, concerning the 
remuneration committee its role is to check on director’s remuneration in order to lead 
to the best interests of the firm. The positive relationship of board committee with long 
term debt ratio may because there is a tendency of borrowing more with less committee. 
 
Table 4.12 - Regression analysis 
Model 3 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
                             Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
Constant 0.860 0.092 0.000 
CGIit -0.131 0.008 0.001 
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Table 4.12 - Regression analysis (cont.) 
Model 3 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
                             Total debt ratio (TDRit) as Dependent variable 
PROFit -0.005 0.067 0.893 
SIZEit 0.012 0.006 0.753 
LIQit -0.635 0.008 0.000 
                           Long -term debt (LTDit) as Dependent variable 
Constant -0.058 0.064 0.364 
CGIit -0.230 0.005 0.000 
PROFit -0.043 0.047 0.368 
SIZEit 0.226 0.004 0.000 
LIQit -0.223 0.005 0.000 
Source: Aamer S. et al. / the IUP journal of corporate governance. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2015  
 
By looking to the table 4.12 one can notice that profitability and liquidity are negatively 
related to leverage which shows clearly that the sample Pakistani firms that have more 
profit and liquidity are more likely to borrow less comparing with firms with lower 
profit and less liquidity. This finding is consistent with pecking order theory mentioned 
in the previous studies which states that firms will first rely on internally generated 
funds(i.e. undistributed earnings), then they will turn to debt if additional funds are 
needed, and finally, they will issue equity to cover any remaining capital requirements 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, liquidity is statistically significant while 
profitability is insignificant. 
 
The Firm size is related positively with leverage. However this association is 
insignificant in terms of total debt ratio and significant in case of long-term debt ratio. 
This positive link is consistent with the findings of previous studies where was found 
that as larger is the firm the more improves it chances to have access to more debt 
extended by banks and other financial institutions, because these firms have established 
their reputation as successful organization and have tangible assets on their balance 
sheet that can be served as collaterals. 
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4.4   Findings of the forth study  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.13 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Dev 
DR 200 0.03 5.19 1.329 1.031 
BS 200 5 14 8.470 1.928 
MOWN 200 0 0.9251 0.240 0.267 
ROA 200 -9.93 53.13 13.297 11.703 
LIQ 200 -6.62 14.43 1.744 1.858 
FS 200 12.75 19.84 16.051 1.441 
Source: state bank of Pakistan’s publications / companies’ annual reports (Muhammad A.N et al. / 
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.3, No.1.Winter 2017) 
 
Table 4.13 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the 
study, both, dependent as well as explanatory variables.  
 
Debt to Equity Ratio: the average debt to equity ratio, which is 1.330, shows excessive 
use of debt by Pakistani sample firms. A higher debt ratio leads to higher risk of default 
and volatility in earnings due to higher interest payment and may leads to the fast 
bankruptcy.  
 
Board Size: Directors on board range from 5 to 14 in number and on average, there are 
9 directors with a standard deviation of 1.928 in Pakistani firms. As a result, this 
number of boards is consistent with Jensen (1983) theory which states that ideally a 
board should have seven to eight members for effective functioning. Hence larger board 
in size may take better decisions and monitor management. As a result pursuing lower 
level of leverage in order to improve the firm´s value. Furthermore, larger boards put 
pressure on managers to follow lower debt equity ratio and enhance firm performance 
Berger (1997). 
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Managerial ownership: ranges from 0 to 92.51% the non-financial Pakistani firms have 
on average 24.09% managerial ownership.  These findings is consistent with the agency 
theory, suggesting that managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers with 
outside shareholders and reduces the role of debt as a tool to mitigate the agency 
conflicts. This result is in line with several researchers’ findings such as Fosberg (2004), 
Friend and Lang (1988) and Bathala et al. (1994). 
 
Return on asset varies between -9.93 and 53.13. The negative value shows failure of 
management in generating returns out of firm’s assets. In addition, the highest value of 
return on asset (53.13) indicates a very efficient utilization of firm’s asset, but this is not 
the case with most firms in this sample. On the other hand, these findings are in line 
with trade-off theory which states that firms can use debt in order to increase their 
profitability which proves the excessive utilization of debt by sample firms.  
 
Liquidity: it ranges between -6.62 and 14.43. Generally a firm with a higher current 
ratio is considered as better off, whereas the firm with a lower current ratio is supposed 
to be worse. On average firms in this sample have a value of 1.744, with a standard 
deviation of 1.858, which indicates that firms have a better ability to pay off its short-
term debt using assets that can be easily liquidated. 
 
Size: The effect of firm size on leverage is ambiguous. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue 
that larger firms generally disclose more information to outsiders than smaller ones. 
Larger firms with less asymmetric information problems should tend to have more 
equity than debt and hence have lower leverage. Therefore, following the pecking order 
theory of capital structure, the size of the firm would be negatively related to leverage. 
On the other hand, according to the trade-off theory larger firms tend to be more 
diversified and thus less prone to bankruptcy. This argument suggests that firm size 
should be positively related to leverage. In our sample the smallest firm in this sample 
has a value of 12.75 and the largest firm has a value of 19.84, on average, firms have 
size of 16.05, as larger firm is, lower the chances of its bankruptcy due to diversified 
portfolios it has (N.Harmassi 2017). 
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Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.14 - Correlation analysis 
Variable BS MOWN ROA LIQ FS 
BS 1     
MOWN -0.27 1    
ROA 0.29 -0.22 1   
LIQ 0.18 -0.26 0.26 1  
FS 0.37 -0.28 0.16 -0.01 1 
Source: state bank of Pakistan’s publications / companies’ annual reports (Muhammad A.N et al. / 
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.3, No.1.Winter 2017) 
 
The table above shows the correlation matrix of independent variables and we can see 
that there is no issue of serious multi-collinearity.  
 
4.5   Findings of the fifth study 
 
Regression model 
 
Table 4.15 - Regression analysis 
Variables Coefficient t-statistics Probability 
Intercept 5.7817 0.631820 0.5277 
Board size - 0.5015 -15.01225 0.0000 
NED'S 0.5825 20.79942 0.0700 
CEO/Chair 0.2735 0.136508 0.8915 
MANGSHR -0.7694 -1.168489 0.0029 
INSHR 0.5291 17.62009 0.0000 
Firm Size 0.5148 11.47233 0.0000 
Profitability -0.0964 -2.102811 0.0358 
Level of significance 5% 
Source: security and exchange commission of Pakistan (SECP) (Tariq R. et al. / Journal of Insurance and 
Financial Management, Vol. 3, Issue 5 (2018) 18-28) 
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                           LEVGit = 5.7817 – 0.5015(Log BSZ)it + 0.5825(%NED's)it  
0.5291(%INSTSHR)it + 0.5291(%INSTSHR)it – 0.7694(MANGSHR)it  
0.0964(ROA)it       – 0.0964(ROA)it + 0.5148(SZE)it+ 0.2735(CEO/Chairman)it              
0.2735(CEO/Chairman)it+µt 
 
The regression analysis in table 4.15 shows that an increase of 1 percent in Profitability 
decreases leverage by 9.6 percent. Which indicates that the more profitable are firms the 
lower is the tendency to debt. This result is consistent with pecking order theory, which 
states that companies use internally generated funds as first priority to finance their 
projects, then they go for debt, and finally they issue equity as a last resort. Which is in 
line with previous studies. 
 
Leverage is positively and significantly related with firm size. Means that a unitary 
increase in firm size leads to an increase in debt financing by 0.5148. This result is quite 
in line with previous findings where was one of the evidences that large firms tend to 
have more debt because of tangible assets they have that can be pledged as collaterals to 
banks and other financial institutions, and also may due to the fact that large firms have 
established their reputation as successful and secure organizations and hence have more 
chances to get loans. 
 
Results reveal a significant and negative relationship between board size and leverage. 
As it was mentioned before in the majority prior studies, This negative link may due the 
fact that larger boards generally follow lower debt by putting pressure on managers to 
pursue lower level of gearing and focusing more on firm performance.  
 
NED's are positively related to leverage. A possible explanation is that more outside 
directors assure rigorous monitoring which lets banks to feel secure and confident in 
dealing with these firms. However, this association is insignificant. This finding it may 
because in developing countries like Pakistan the families owned business and the 
NED's are not independent in true sense and hence ineffective in board. Therefore, the 
absence of INEDs and the domination of a board by a close family deprive Pakistani 
selected firms from sound corporate governance, thus, having a higher gearing level. 
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CEO/Chairman duality appeared positively related to leverage of the selected firms, as 
is shown in the table, when CEO duality increases one unit, the debt to equity increases 
by 0.2735. This result is not consistent with the findings of previous studies. This may 
because when CEO serves also as chairman, he may reduce information asymmetric 
problem and leads to higher excess to external financing.  Furthermore, according to 
stewardship theory, CEO duality reduces communication conflict in an uncertain 
environment and thus creates a clear sense of strategic decision. The table 4.15 shows 
an insignificant relationship between CEO duality and debt which is in line with prior 
findings where was found the dependence of CEO duality because Pakistani firms are 
family owned. 
 
Institutional shareholders appeared positive and statistically significant with leverage. A 
possible explanation is that, the presence of institutional shareholders in a company may 
assure an effective monitoring device over the company strategic decisions, 
encouraging lenders to deal with these firms. And hence the chances of getting more 
loans is higher. 
 
Regression analysis table reveals that managerial Shareholding affect negatively 
leverage. In effect, an increase in managerial shareholding by 1 percent leads to decline 
in debt level by 0.76 percent. It may be reasoned that higher levels of managerial 
ownership results in managerial opportunism and ultimately leads to lower debt level 
(Brailsford, 2002). These results are supported with Friend, Irwin and Lang (1988) who 
discussed the role of managerial self-interest in making capital structure decisions. They 
suggested that in the absence of any outsider principal stockholder the tendency of low 
debt to equity ratio will continue which will lead to higher non diversifiable risk of debt 
to management. 
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Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.16 - Correlation analysis 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
Leverage 1         
Board size -0.810* 1        
NED’s 0.519  1       
CEO/Chair 0.390   1      
MANGSHR -0.498*    1     
INSSHR 0.701*     1    
Firm size 0.594**      1   
Profitability -0.691*        1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: security and exchange commission of Pakistan (SECP) (Tariq R. et al. / Journal of Insurance and 
Financial Management, Vol. 3, Issue 5 (2018) 18-28) 
 
Table 4.16 presents the correlation results between both, developed and developing 
countries firms operating in Pakistan. 
 
The correlation table shows that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
profitability and leverage in terms of developed and developing countries firms, this 
goes along with the pecking order theory, means that firms have pecking order in the 
choice of financing their activities. In otherwise, firms prefer internal funds rather than 
external funds, this means that the more profitable is the firm, the less prone to debt will 
be. Instead, it uses their own profits to finance operations.   
 
 A negative and significant correlation is observed between managerial shareholding 
and leverage whether in terms of developed countries firms, such as US firms where 
Jensen et al. (1992) and Firth (1995) have documented that managers possess less 
diversified portfolios than other shareholders and thus have more incentive to reduce 
potential bankruptcy risk. Otherwise, higher managerial self-interests in long term 
sustainability of the company may induce managers to reduce gearing levels, Or in case 
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of   developing countries firms such as Pakistani firms where Hassan and Butt (2009) 
have found a negative relation between managerial ownership and capital structure, 
either Huang and Song (2016) have found the same findings by studying the 
relationship between managerial ownership and leverage in Chinese listed firms and 
suggested that with the increase of managerial ownership , managers are more risk 
averse due to their non-diversified portfolios, thus they tend to borrow less to reduce the 
cost of bankruptcy. 
 
Correlation analysis shows also negative and significant relationship between board size 
and leverage in developing and developed countries, this association can be explained 
that the pressure practiced on managers push them to adopt lower debt levels in order to 
enhance the firm performance. This result is in line with Friend and Lang (1988) 
findings who suggested that debt has a great non-diversifiable risk of insiders than it has 
for outside, investors, inducing insiders to maintain lower levels of leverage. 
 
Firm size appeared positively and significantly correlated to debt, this is especially 
rational in case of developed countries where larger firms have more assets as 
collaterals, and it is easier for them to negotiate better terms with lenders. According to 
King (1977) larger firms have higher collateral values and lesser bankruptcy risks. Also 
Pandy et al. (2004) documented that larger firms are more diversified, they have higher 
capacity to meet up with interest payment. Conversely, the use of high level of debt by 
firms in developing countries is limited, may because their scales of operations are also 
limited which may prone these firms to risks associated with distress and bankruptcy, as 
well as loss of ownership. 
 
The table 4.16 shows a positive correlation between non executive’s directors and 
leverage in both developed and developing countries firms. According to AL-najjar and 
Hussainy (2011), firms with a large portion of non-executive members seem to have 
favorable and easier access to loans and therefore, applied a higher level of debt. Also 
Berger et.al. (1997) suggest that those CEOs that are more actively controlled and 
monitoring by more outside directors, causing managers to employ more debts and raise 
the firm leverage. However, this relationship is significant only in terms of developed 
countries firms where NED´s make their own independent decisions, on the contrary, it 
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is not significant in case of developing countries firms, because developing countries 
firms are generally family owned and NED’s are working dependently in the firms. 
 
CEO was found positively correlated to leverage. Stewardship theory predicts that when 
the CEO is also the chairman, both, power and authority will be concentrated in the 
hand of one person. According to this theory, the CEO duality decreases 
communication conflicts, and creates a clear sense of centralized decision making, and 
hence increasing firm debt usage (Mokarami et al., 2012). However, the relationship is 
significant in developed countries firms and not significant in case of developing 
countries firms where the business is owned by families. 
 
Institutional shareholders are statistically significant and positively related with debt to 
equity ratio in both developed and developing countries firms. Joher Huson et al. (2006) 
suggest that this positive relationship may due the fact that institutional ownership plays 
an essential role as a monitoring device to minimize agency problem. Essentially, they 
bring down the company´s agency costs and reduce managerial opportunism. In 
addition, these investors themselves act as a source of long-term debt as they are debt 
providers to a company over whose board, they enjoy an influence, and hence, the 
higher are institutional shareholding of the firms, the more is the tendency to have 
higher debt. 
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary 
 
This study empirically studies the impact of corporate governance on capital structure 
of non-financial listed companies over a different period of time, evidence from 
Pakistani listed firms. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that the corporate governance is statistically 
significant and negatively related to capital structure. The analysis shows that corporate 
governance metrics are at some extent appropriate to explain the financial decision of 
Pakistani firms even though the corporate governance structure of Pakistani firms is not 
very well developed. 
 
Results presented in this study showed some evidence that managerial ownership found 
to have negative and significant impact on debt to equity ratio ,i.e, used as the measure 
of capital structure ,that is to say, an increase in managerial shareholding leads to 
reduction in leverage, indicating that concentration of ownership leads managers 
pursuing lower gearing level. 
 
 Board size shows negative and significant association with debt ratio which indicates 
that the larger is the size of board the more owners put pressure on managers to pursue 
lower debt. 
 
Size of the firm has a positive relationship which indicates that large firms can arrange 
debt financing due to long term relationship and better collateral offering. 
 
Profitability is negatively related to debt equity ratio and is consistent with pecking 
order theory of capital structure proposed by Myers(1984), which states that as firms( in 
this case Pakistani firms) earn higher returns on assets they have the propensity to rely 
more on internal financing, hence, resulting on less dependence on debt. 
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Results reveal that representation of NEDs on board and CEO/chair Duality have no 
significant relationship with debt to equity ratio. Which arises the idea that NEDs in 
Pakistani firms are not independent due to the family companies dominated in Pakistan. 
 
This research adds a new piece to the puzzle of capital structure and clarified the link 
between corporate governance and capital structure. 
 
The findings showed a strong association between capital structure and corporate 
governance. Although important steps have been taken by the Pakistani government, 
essentially implement of corporate governance codes for all listed firms, for the 
development of corporate governance in the country, but still firms in Pakistan have 
weak mechanisms of corporate governance. 
 
5.2 Recommendations and Perspectives for Future Research 
 
The study is subject of various limitations. Primarily, the current economic conditions 
of the country might vary in the future. Secondly, even was conducted five empirical 
studies in this paper there are more companies also listed in Pakistan stock exchange if 
they were subject of study  may they would provide different  results, otherwise, by 
increasing the data sample might have different impact on statistics. Moreover, the 
study collect data only from companies listed in KSE. This means that the study 
findings are skewed and only informs on the relationship between corporate governance 
and capital structure of the companies listed in KSE. However the findings could be 
different in other companies which operate outside the KSE. Hence, future research is 
required to offer a further –in depth body of knowledge into the effect of corporate 
governance determinants on capital structure. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Correlation analysis 
 
                                 Table 4.5- Correlation analysis 
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Source: Nadeen A.and Zongjun W. / The international journal of business in society, Vol. 12 Issue: 5, 
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Appendix 2: selected papers 
 
Study 1: 
Arshad  et al. (2009) 
 
Data 
Sample:  59 firms 
Period:  2002-2005 
Methodology: multivariate regression 
analysis. 
Theme: Impact of ownership structure and 
corporate governance on capital structure 
of Pakistani listed companies. 
 
Study 2: 
 Nadeem and Zongjun. (2012) 
Data 
Sample:  155 firms 
Period:  2004-2008 
Methodology: multiple regression 
analysis. 
Theme:  Effect of corporate governance 
on capital structure: Empirical evidence 
from Pakistan 
 
Study 3: 
Aamer et al. (2015) 
 
Data 
Sample:  67 firms 
Period:  2007-2012 
Methodology: Panel data analysis 
Theme: Investigating the impact of 
corporate governance on capital 
structure: A case of KSE-listed companies. 
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Study 4: 
Muhammad et al. (2017) 
 
Data 
Sample:  40 firms 
Period:  2009-2013 
Methodology: Panel data analysis 
Theme: Capital structure and corporate 
governance 
 
Study 5: 
Rameez and Muhammad. (2018) 
 
 
Data 
Sample:  10 firms (05 developed countries 
and 05 developing countries) 
Period:  2010-2016 
Theme: Ownership structure, corporate 
governance and capital structure: 
Evidence from countries having FPI in 
Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
